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Abstract
We consider retail space-exchange problems where two retailers exchange shelf space to increase
accessibility to more of their consumers in more locations without opening new stores. Using
the Hotelling model, we nd two retailersoptimal prices given their host and guest space in
two stores under the space-exchange strategy. Next, using the optimal space-dependent prices,
we analyze a non-cooperative game where each retailer makes a space allocation decision for the
retailers own store. We show that the two retailers will implement such a strategy in the game,
if and only if their stores are large enough to serve more than one-half of their consumers.
Nash equilibrium for the game exists and its value depends on consumersutilities and trip
costs as well as the total available space in each retailers store. Moreover, as a result of the
space-exchange strategy, each retailers prices in two stores are both higher than the retailers
price before the space exchange but they may or may not be identical.
Key words: Retail space-exchange, price, space allocation, Hotelling model, game theory.
1 Introduction
Can retailers selling di¤erent products implement partnership strategies that involve exchanging
shelf space to improve their operating performance? Consider the following problem (and
its solution) that was experienced by the British supermarket chain of food-related products
known as Waitrose [15]: Even though its sales were increasing, many of Waitroses potential
customers were having di¢ culty accessing its stores because no new stores were being opened.
In order to increase accessibility to more of its customers in more locations without opening new
stores, Waitrose established new channels and implemented a new business model. This was
achieved by initiating strategic relationships with the British retailer of healthcare products
known as Boots. Waitrose and Boots now stock selective product ranges in each others
stores; more specically, Waitroses food products are sold in Bootss stores, while the latter
retailers healthcare products are displayed for sale in Waitrose stores. The cooperation between
Waitrose and Boots can be regarded as an implementation of the retail space-exchange strategy;
see Stych [14] for a magazine article describing this partnership.
Waitrose and Boots have successfully implemented the space-exchange strategy, as indicated
in a report by The Waitrose Press Center [15]. As another successful example of this novel
strategy, Canadas favourite doughnut store known as Tim Hortons has been working with the
U.S.-based Cold Stone Creamery (a chain stores of ice cream) to implement the space-exchange
strategy and operate their co-brandedstores. This practice involves 100 stores in the U.S. and
six in Canada. For more information, see Draper [5] for an article describing the partnership
between Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery.
With the novel retailing practice described above, when two retailers (say, 1 and 2) imple-
ment their space-exchange strategy, a retailers consumers can buy in either the retailers own
store or the other retailers store, which means that such a strategy can result in an increased
store choice for consumers. It is reasonable to expect that each consumer would buy in a store
that is closer to his or her residence location, thereby incurring lower travel costs and increasing
the willingness to buy at a higher retail price. Specically, when two retailers do not exchange
their space, consumers who intend to buy a retailers product will have to visit the retailers
own store; but, after the space exchange, some consumers may decide to shop at the other
retailers store (because it is closer to those consumers). This implies that the space-exchange
strategy will reduce the travelling costs of some consumers who buy a retailers product at the
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other retailers store. Since each consumer does not need to incur a high travelling cost, he or
she should be willing to buy even if the retail price is increased. Thus, both retailers 1 and 2
may respond by raising their prices to increase their prot margins. This can be regarded as
the most important benet derived from the space-exchange strategy. We nd that each re-
tailers pricing and space allocation decisions are important to the success of the space-exchange
strategy, which are the focused research questions in our paper.
One may question why the two retailers do not sell both products 1 and 2 by themselves in
their own stores but instead exchange shelf space for the sale of these products. We present three
reasons for this: First, when the two retailers sell identical products at their sites, they have to
compete for consumers, which may result in the reduction of the two retailersprots. Second,
the two retailers have more information about their own products and are thus specialized in
their product sales. If each retailer sells his own product and also the other retailers product,
then the retailer has to allocate his e¤orts for the sale of the product that is unfamiliar to the
retailer; this may reduce the retailers operational protability. Third, since the retailers should
have already served their markets before the space exchange, their established reputations may
a¤ect consumers purchasing decisions. Hence, to reduce the operational risk, each retailer
should optimally allocate his space to the other retailer and thus take advantage of the other
retailers reputation to e¢ ciently provide more choices to consumers.
As the above discussion indicates, the space-exchange strategy should generate benets to
both retailers and their consumers; and, in practice, some retailers (e.g., Waitrose and Boots,
Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) have already successfully implemented this strategy.
Despite the apparent importance of this strategy, our literature search did not reveal any
research papers dealing with space-exchange problems. There are a number of space-related
publications, which do not consider the space exchange-related issues. In one publication that is
closely related to our paper, Jerath and Zhang [9] consider a store-within-a-store arrangement
in which a retailer rents out her retail space to two manufacturers who then have complete
autonomy over retail decisions such as pricing and in-store service. The authors develop an
analytical model to investigate the retailers trade-o¤between channel e¢ ciency and interbrand
competition. They show that the retailer cannot credibly commit to the retail prices and service
levels that two manufacturers can achieve in an integrated channel, and she should thus allow the
manufacturers to set up stores within her store. In another related publication, [4], Martínez-de-
Albéniz and Roels analyze a shelf-space competition problem where a single retailer optimizes
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her shelf space allocation among multiple suppliersdi¤erent products based on their sales level
and prot margins. The authors examine the equilibrium situation in the supply chain, and
found that, in general, the retailers and the suppliersincentives are misaligned, resulting in
suboptimal retail prices and shelf space allocations. Other recent representative space-related
publications include Baron, Berman, and Perry [1], Campo, et al. [2], Kurtulus¸ and Toktay
[10], and Wang and Gerchak [17].
In this paper, we use the Hotelling model [8] in Section 2 to analyze the space-exchange
problem where retailers 1 and 2 are located at two end points of a linear city. For detailed
discussions on the Hotelling model and its extensions, see, e.g., Martin [11] and Tirole [16]. The
Hotelling model has been widely used to analyze marketing- and operations management-related
problems. The recent representative publications, where the Hotelling models are considered,
include, e.g., Dasci and Laporte [3], Ghosh and Balachander [6], Granot, Granot, and Raviv
[7], and Sajeesh and Raju [12].
In our space-exchange problem, retailer i (i = 1; 2) sells product i to his consumers who
are uniformly distributed between the two retailers. Since the success of the space-exchange
strategy naturally depends on whether or not each retailer benets from this strategy, we begin
our analysis by nding each retailers optimal pricing decision and maximum prot when they
do not exchange shelf space, which are later compared with two retailersprots under the
space-exchange strategy. Next, when the two retailers decide to exchange shelf space, we rst
temporarily assume that, in each store, two retailers have su¢ ciently large space to serve all
of their consumers, and calculate their corresponding optimal prices with no space (capacity)
constraint.
We then nd in Section 3 each retailers optimal prices under the space constraint, i.e.,
the retailers host space in his own store and his guest space allocated by the other retailer
are arbitrarily given. Using two retailersoptimal space-dependent prices, we next analyze in
Section 4 a non-cooperative game where each retailer maximizes his total prot in two stores to
determine optimal space allocation decision for his own store and nd the corresponding optimal
prices for his product in two stores. We perform our best-response analysis for two retailers,
and nd that Nash equilibrium for the game may or may not uniquely exist, which depends on
consumersconsumption utilities, trip cost, and the total space in each store. We show that,
adopting the Nash equilibrium, each retailer can achieve a higher prot than before the space
exchange. In Section 5, we discuss possible changes of our major results in the presence of a
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commonconsumer who buys both products 1 and 2, or those when a retailers xed cost of
opening and sta¢ ng a new store is considered.
2 Preliminaries
As indicated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots and also by that of Tim Hortons and
Cold Stone Creamery, the retail space-exchange strategy applies only when the cooperating
retailersproducts are neither substitutable nor complementary, e.g., Waitroses food vs. Bootss
healthcare products; and, Tim Hortonss doughnuts vs. Cold Stone Creamerys ice cream.
Thus, we can reasonably assume that the products in categories i = 1; 2 sold by retailer i = 1; 2,
are neither substitutable nor complementary.
The total shelf space that is owned by retailer i is denoted by Si > 0 for i = 1; 2. To
implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i who sells product i decides to allocate the
retail space Sij 2 [0; Si] to retailer j (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i) who can then sell product j using
the space Sij at the site of retailer i as the guest retailer.As a result of the space exchange,
retailer i sells product i in the remaining space Sii  Si   Sij at his own store as the host
retailer.As discussed in Section 1, when two retailers exchange shelf space, their customers
may incur lower travel costs, and the two retailers may thus increase their retail prices without
losing customers. This may be regarded as an important reason why retailers (e.g., Waitrose
and Boots, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) exchange shelf space. Accordingly, we
consider the Hotelling model [8] to analyze our space-exchange problem, assuming that two
retailers are located at the end points of a linear city of length 1, and all consumers are
uniformly distributed along the city.
Since the two retailers are willing to exchange shelf space when they can enjoy more prots
from the strategy, we need to compare the two retailersprots before and after the exchange
of shelf space. We next begin by computing two retailersoptimal prices and corresponding
maximum prots when they do not exchange shelf space but only operate in their own stores.
2.1 Optimal Pricing Decision with No Space Exchange
When retailers 1 and 2 do not exchange shelf space, they sell products 1 and 2 at the retail
prices p1 and p2, respectively. Total number of consumers for product i is Bi, for i = 1; 2. In
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this paper, we assume that there is no commonconsumer who intends to buy both products
1 and 2; that is, B1 and B2 are disjoint. In Section 5.1, we will discuss the impacts of relaxing
such an assumption on our major results. As in the Hotelling model [8], each consumer incurs
the transportation cost t per unit of trip length, which includes the consumers value of time.
Let x 2 [0; 1] denote a point in the linear city. Assuming that the locations of retailers 1 and
2 are x = 0 and x = 1, respectively, we can calculate the trip cost of the product 1 consumer
(who is served by retailer 1) at the point x 2 [0; 1] as tx, and also compute that of the product
2 consumer (who is served by retailer 2) at the point x 2 [0; 1] as t(1   x); see Figure 1. In
addition, each product i (i = 1; 2) consumer is assumed to draw a gross utility ui from buying
a unit of product i.
Figure 1: The trip cost of product 1 consumers (who are served by retailer 1) and that of
product 2 consumers (who are served by retailer 2). Note that the solid and dashed lines
between the two retailers represent the uniform distribution of product 1 consumers and that
of product 2 consumers, respectively.
Using the above, we nd that the product 1 consumer at the point x 2 [0; 1] obtains the
utility u1 but incurs the purchase cost p1 and the trip cost tx, and the product 2 consumer at
the point x 2 [0; 1] gets the utility u2 but incurs the purchase cost p2 and the trip cost t(1 x).
It thus follows that the net utility function of the consumer at location x is calculated as,
ux =
8<: ux1  u1   p1   tx, if product 1 bought in retailer 1s store,ux2  u2   p2   t(1  x), if product 2 bought in retailer 2s store. (1)
A product 1 consumer should be willing to buy from retailer 1 if ux1  0, or, x  x1  (u1 p1)=t.
This means that only the product 1 consumers who are located between 0 (retailer 1s location)
and x1 should decide to buy. Naturally, retailer 1 should set his retail price p1 such that
0  x1  1, or u1   t  p1  u1. Similarly, retailer 2 should determine her price p2 such that
u2   t  p2  u2.
Then, we can calculate the demand faced by retailer i (i = 1; 2) as Di = Bi(ui   pi)=t.
However, each retailer may or may not satisfy his demand, because he only has the space Si to
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stock product i. Assuming that each retailer can display one unit of his product on a unit of
the retail space, we nd that retailer i can realize the sales min[Bi(ui   pi)=t; Si], and achieve
the prot as,
i = (pi   ci) min[Bi(ui   pi)=t; Si] = Bi(pi   ci) min[(ui   pi)=t; Si=Bi], (2)
where ci denotes retailer is unit acquisition cost. To determine the optimal price pi for retailer
i, we must solve the constrained maximization problem, maxui tpiui i.
Lemma 1 When two retailers do not exchange shelf space, the optimal prices and maximum
prots for retailer i (i = 1; 2) can be found as follows:
Conditions Optimal Price Maximum Prot
Si  Bi ci + 2t  ui (ui + ci)=2 Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
ci + 2t  ui ui   t Bi(ui   t  ci)
Si < Bi ci + 2tSi=Bi  ui (ui + ci)=2 Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
ci + 2tSi=Bi  ui ui   tSi=Bi [ui   tSi=Bi   ci]Si
Proof. For a proof of this lemma and the proofs of all subsequent lemmas, see online Appendix
A.
2.2 Optimal Retail Prices under the Space-Exchange Strategy with
Su¢ ciently-Large Host and Guest Spaces
We consider the two retailersoptimal pricing decisions when they decide to exchange shelf
space. Now, we temporarily assume that each retailers host space and guest space are large
enough to serve all of the retailers consumers; and, under this assumption, we compute the
retailers optimal prices. After the space exchange, each consumer can buy in either retailer 1s
store or retailer 2s store, which depends on from which store the consumer can draw a higher
net utility. Consider the product i (i = 1; 2) consumer who resides at the point x 2 [0; 1] and
decides to buy a unit of product i from retailer i at either his host space [in retailer is store] or
his guest space [in retailer js (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i) store]. We compute the consumers utilities
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drawn from purchasing from two stores as,
u^xi =
8<: u^xi1  ui   pi1   tx, if product i bought in retailer 1s store,u^xi2  ui   pi2   t(1  x), if product i bought in retailer 2s store, (3)
where u^xij denotes the product i consumers net utility drawn from buying at retailer js store,
and pij represents the retail price of product i in retailer js store.
Similar to Section 2.1, we can compute the demands faced by retailer i in two stores, as
given in the following remark. For a detailed discussion, see online Appendix C.
Remark 1 We nd the demands for retailer is product (i = 1; 2) as follows:
1. If pi1 + pi2  2ui   t, then the demands faced by retailer i in retailer 1s and retailer
2s stores are computed as Di1 = Bi(pi2   pi1 + t)=(2t) and Di2 = Bi(pi1   pi2 + t)=(2t),
respectively. Note that Di1 +Di2 = Bi.
2. If pi1 + pi2 > 2ui   t, then the demands faced by retailer i are computed as Di1 =
Bi(ui pi1)=t andDi2 = Bi(ui pi2)=t. The total demand for product i is thus Di1 +Di2 =
Bi(2ui   pi1   pi2)=t  Bi.
From the above we nd that all product i consumers will buy when pi1+pi2  2ui t whereas
some consumer(s) may not buy when pi1 + pi2  2ui   t. Note that, if pi1 + pi2 = 2ui   t, then
the demands for the above two cases are the same. C
The above remark indicates that retailer i can set suitable retail prices pi1 and pi2 to a¤ect
consumerspurchasing decisions. That is, if the retailer does not have su¢ cient space in two
retailersstores, then he may determine his retail prices under the condition that pi1 + pi2 
2ui   t. Otherwise, if the retailers shelf space in the two stores is large enough to satisfy Bi
product i consumers, then the retailer may need to consider the condition that pi1 +pi2  2ui t
to make his pricing decisions.
Lemma 2 When retailer i (i = 1; 2) has su¢ ciently large host and guest shelf space, we nd
his optimal prices (p0i1; p
0
i2) and resulting demands (Di1; Di2) in two stores, and compute his
maximum prot, as given in Table 1. 
As the above lemma indicates, retailer i may need to determine his prices in two stores to
serve some, rather than all, of Bi product i consumers, if the product i consumer residing at
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Condition Optimal Prices Demands Maximum Prot
ui > ci + t p
0
i1 = p
0
i2 = ui  
t
2
Di1 = Di2 =
Bi
2
Bi

ui   ci   t
2

ui  ci + t p0i1 = p0i2 =
ui + ci
2
Di1 = Di2 = Bi
ui   ci
2t
Bi
(ui   ci)2
2t
Table 1: Retailer is optimal prices p0i1 and p
0
i2, and the resulting demands Di1 and Di2 in
retailer 1s and retailer 2s stores, respectively; and the retailers maximum prot generated in
the two stores.
the location of retailer js store (j = 1; 2, j 6= i) cannot enjoy a positive net utility from buying
product i in retailer is store, i.e., ui  ci + t.
3 Optimal Prices Given the Space Allocation Decisions
In this section, we consider two retailersoptimal pricing decisions given the space-allocation
decisions in two stores. (The results here di¤er from those in Section 2.2 where we determine
the two retailers optimal prices assuming that they have su¢ cient host and guest space.)
Subsequently, using each retailers optimal space-dependent prices in two stores, we nd the
optimal allocation of the total space Si (i = 1; 2) between the two retailers.
Next, we determine retailer is (i = 1; 2) optimal pricing decisions (pi1 and pi2) given the
host space Sii in his own store and the guest space Sji = Sj Sjj in retailer js (j = 1; 2, j 6= i)
store. Since one unit of product i is carried per unit of shelf space, the total number of product
i available for sale in two stores can be calculated as Ti  S1i + S2i. Note that each retailers
maximum available products in each store can be regarded as the capacity for the retailer,
who should thus make his or her optimal pricing decisions under the capacity constraint.
As Lemma 2 indicates, retailer is optimal pricing decisions with no capacity constraint
depend on the comparison between ui and ci + t. Accordingly, we consider the two cases, (i)
ui > ci + t, and (ii) ui  ci + t; and for each case, we nd retailer is optimal prices under the
capacity constraints (i.e., at most Sii and Sji units of product i are available for sale in retailer
is own store and in retailer js store).
3.1 Optimal Prices when ui > ci + t
If ui > ci + t, then we learn from Lemma 2 that retailer i should make his pricing decisions
to serve all Bi product i consumers, which requires this retailer to have a su¢ ciently-large
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space to stock Bi units of product i. Additionally, since retailer is prot is maximized when
Sii = Sji = Bi=2, his desired host space and guest space should be both equal to Bi=2. However,
the space allocated to retailer i in each store may be di¤erent from Bi=2, and the total space
for retailer i in two stores may or may not be large enough to serve all of Bi consumers. More
specically, if the total space for retailer i is given such that Sii + Sji  Bi, then the total
demand Bi can be satised; but, if Sii + Sji < Bi, then only a part of the demand will be
fullled.
Lemma 3 Suppose that retailer is (i = 1; 2) host space and guest space are given as Sii 2 [0; Si]
and Sji 2 [0; Sj], for j = 1; 2, and j 6= i. If ui > ci + t, then retailer is optimal prices in two
stores are found as follows:
1. If retailer is total space Sii + Sji in two stores is large enough to serve all of Bi product
i consumers, i.e., Sii + Sji  Bi, then the retailers optimal prices in his own store and
retailer js store denoted by pii and p

ij, respectively are determined as given in Table
2.
Conditions pii p

ij
Sii  Bi=2
Sji  Bi=2 ui  
t
2
ui   t
2
Sii < Bi=2
Sji > Bi=2
ui   tSii
Bi
max

ui + ci
2
; ui   t

1  Sii
Bi

Sii > Bi=2
Sji < Bi=2
max

ui + ci
2
; ui   t

1  Sji
Bi

ui   tSji
Bi
Table 2: Retailer is optimal price pii and p

ij for product i in his host space Sii 2 [0; Si] and
his guest space Sji 2 [0; Sj], respectively, when ui > ci + t and Sii + Sji  Bi.
2. If Sii + Sji < Bi, then the retailers optimal pricing decisions are obtained as, pii =
max[(ui + ci)=2; ui   tSii=Bi] and pij = max[(ui + ci)=2; ui   tSji=Bi]. 
Next, we compare retailer is optimal price with no space exchange as given in Lemma
1 and the optimal price under the space-exchange strategy as given in Lemma 3, in order to
examine the impact of the strategy on the retailers pricing decision.
Lemma 4 When ui > ci + t (i = 1; 2) and retailer is host space and guest space are given as
Sii 2 [0; Si] and Sji 2 [0; Sj] (j = 1; 2, j 6= i), respectively, the retailers optimal price pii in his
own store is greater than his optimal price pi that is obtained when there is no space exchange,
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i.e., pii > p

i . However, retailer is optimal price p

ij in retailer js store may or may not be
greater than pi . Specically, if the total space Si in retailer is own store is larger than or equal
to Bi(ui   ci)=(2t), i.e., Si  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t), then pij is always greater than pi . Otherwise,
then pij may not be greater than p

i . 
This lemma says that, if retailer i has a su¢ ciently large space in his own store, i.e., Si 
Bi(ui   ci)=(2t), then his prices in two stores under the space-exchange strategy should be
higher than the price when two retailers do not exchange shelf space. Moreover, we note that
Bi(ui   ci)=(2t) > Bi=2 because ui > ci + t. This means that the prices should rise as a result
of the space-exchange strategy, if the total available space Si in retailer is store is large enough
to satisfy more than a half of product i consumers (including some consumers who are closer to
retailer js store). This interesting result may be justied as follows: After the space exchange,
those consumers closer to retailer js store could visit retailer js store to buy product i. That
is, retailer i may serve fewer consumers in his own store, and may thus raise his retail price to
increase his prot.
Remark 2 Lemma 3 was used for comparing retailer is (i = 1; 2) prices under di¤erent condi-
tions. We can use the same lemma to calculate the retailers maximum prot as given in Table
3. C
Conditions Retailer is Maximum Prot
Sii  Bi=2, Sji  Bi=2 1i  Bi (ui   ci   t=2)
Sii <
Bi
2
Sii  Bi

1  ui   ci
2t

2i  Bi(ui   ci   t)
+2tSii(1  Sii=Bi)
Sii + Sji
 Bi Sji >
Bi
2
Sii  Bi

1  ui   ci
2t

3i  Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
+(ui   tSii=Bi   ci)Sii
Sii >
Bi
2
Sji  Bi

1  ui   ci
2t

4i  Bi(ui   ci   t)
+2tSji(1  Sji=Bi)
Sji <
Bi
2
Sji  Bi

1  ui   ci
2t

5i  Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
+(ui   tSji=Bi   ci)Sji
Sii  Bi ui   ci
2t
Sji  Bi ui   ci
2t
6i  (ui   tSii=Bi   ci)Sii
+(ui   tSji=Bi   ci)Sji
Sii + Sji
< Bi
Sii  Bi ui   ci
2t
Sji  Bi ui   ci
2t
7i  Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
+(ui   tSji=Bi   ci)Sji
Sii  Bi ui   ci
2t
Sji  Bi ui   ci
2t
8i  Bi(ui   ci)2=(4t)
+(ui   tSii=Bi   ci)Sii
Table 3: Retailer is maximum prot when ui > ci + t.
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In Section 2.1 we found retailer is optimal pricing decision and computed the corresponding
maximum prot when the two retailers do not exchange shelf space. We now compare retailer
is maximum prot (i) with no space exchange and (ii) with space exchange strategy, in order
to examine whether or not two retailers can benet from the strategy.
Corollary 1 If the two retailers implement the space-exchange strategy when ui > ci+ t, then
we nd that ii (i = 1; : : : ; 8, i 6= 6) in Table 3 is greater than retailer is prot when two
retailers do not exchange shelf space. However, 6i in Table 3 may be smaller than the retailers
prot with no space exchange. J
As the above corollary indicates, retailer i (i = 1; 2) may be worse o¤ under the space-
exchange strategy, if he cannot use his host space and guest space to serve all of Bi product i
consumers (i.e., Sii + Sji < Bi), and both the host space and the guest space are smaller than
a threshold value [i.e., Sii, Sji  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)]. This means that, in order to cooperate for
such a strategy, retailer i should retain a su¢ ciently large host space and retailer j (j = 1; 2,
j 6= i) must also allocate a su¢ ciently large guest space to retailer i. However, even though
6i in Table 3 may be smaller than the prot with no space exchange, retailer i should still be
better o¤ from implementing the space-exchange strategy because he can choose to allocate Sii
units to himself. For example, the retailer can increase S11 to a level such that his prot is 7i ,
which is higher than the retailers prot when there is no space exchange.
3.2 Optimal Prices when ui  ci + t
When ui  ci+t (i = 1; 2), we found in Lemma 2 that, if there is no capacity constraint, retailer
is prot is maximized when pii = pij = (ui + ci)=2 (j = 1; 2, j 6= i) and the corresponding
demands in two stores are Dii = Dij = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t). We now investigate the retailers
optimal pricing decisions given his host space and guest space.
Lemma 5 Suppose that retailer is (i = 1; 2) host space and guest space are given as Sii 2 [0; Si]
and Sji 2 [0; Sj], for j = 1; 2, j 6= i. If ui  ci + t, retailer is optimal prices in two stores
are found as pii = max[(ui + ci)=2; ui   tSii=Bi] and pij = max[(ui + ci)=2; ui   tSji=Bi]. If
Si  Bi(ui   t)=(2t), then retailer is optimal prices pii and pij under the space-exchange
strategy are both higher than his optimal price pi when two retailers do not exchange shelf
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space. However, if Si < Bi(ui  ci)=(2t), then pii is always greater than pi ; but, pij may or may
not be greater than pi . We nd that p

ij > p

i when Sji  Si. 
Lemma 5 gives us retailer is pricing decisions in two stores, when the product i consumer
residing at the location of a retailers store cannot enjoy a positive net utility if he or she
decides to buy in the other retailers store (i.e., ui  ci + t). As Lemma 5 implies, the retailer
should increase his price in his own store, when he cooperates with the other retailer for the
space-exchange strategy. However, after retailer i also operates in retailer js store using the
guest space Sji, his price for product i in retailer js store may be lower than that in retailer is
own store before the space exchange. More specically, if the total space Si in retailer is store
is su¢ ciently large [i.e., Si  Bi(ui   t)=(2t)], then, no matter what the guest space Sji that
is allocated by retailer j to retailer i is, retailer i should always set the price pij higher than
pi . Otherwise, if retailer i cannot use the total space Si in his own store to serve a half of Bi
product i consumers, i.e., Si < Bi(ui   ci)=(2t), then the retailer may or may not set a price
higher than pi , which depends on the value of the guest space Sji. If the guest space is larger
than the total space Si in retailer is own store, then retailer i may choose a price lower than
pi in order to entice more consumers to buy product i in retailer js store, because the space in
the retailers own store is very small. Otherwise, if the guest space Sji is also very small (i.e.,
Sji < S1), then retailer i is unable to serve all (or even, most of) product i consumers, and
should thus increase the prices in two stores to improve his prot.
Lemmas 4 and 5 indicates the comparison between retailer is optimal prices with and
without the space exchange, for the case that ui > ci + t and the case that ui  ci + t,
respectively. Using these results, we reach a conclusion regarding the impacts of the space-
exchange strategy on the retail prices, as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When retailers 1 and 2 implement the space-exchange strategy, each retailers
prices for his products in two stores are higher than the retailers price in his own store when
two retailers do not exchange shelf space.
Proof. A proof for this proposition and our proofs for all subsequent propositions are provided
in online Appendix B.
The above proposition indicates that, if two retailers decide to exchange shelf space, then
they should raise their retail prices. Using Lemmas 3 and 5, we can also nd the following
result regarding each retailers two prices in two stores.
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Proposition 2 Retailer i (i = 1; 2) may determine di¤erent prices for product i in two stores.
That is, after two retailers exchange shelf space, the retail prices of the same products at two
stores may not be identical. 
We also note from Lemmas 3 and 5 that retailer is optimal pricing decisions when ui  ci+t
are the same as those when ui > ci+t and Sii+Sji < Bi. Thus, the retailers possible maximum
prots when ui  ci+t should include those when Sii+Sji < Bi in Table 3. Similar to Corollary
1, we nd that, when ui  ci + t, ki (k = 7; 8) as given in Table 3 is greater than retailer is
prot when two retailers do not exchange shelf space; but, 6i in Table 3 may be smaller than
the retailers prot with no space exchange, which depends on the values of Sii and Sji.
In addition to ki (k = 6; 7; 8) in Table 3, retailer i may achieve the maximum prot 
9
i 
Bi(ui   ci)2=(2t), which occurs when ui  ci + 2tSii=Bi and u1  c1 + 2tS21=B1. Note that
9i is not considered for the case that Sii + Sji < Bi in Table 3, because the conditions that
ui  ci + 2tSii=Bi and ui  ci + 2tSji=Bi imply that Sii + Sji  Bi, which is contrary to the
case that Sii + Sji < Bi.
Similar to our previous discussion for the case that ui > ci + t, we nd that, if retailer is
host space and guest space are both small, then the retailer may not achieve a higher prot
from implementing the space-exchange strategy and may thus lose the incentive to cooperate
with retailer j. On the other hand, if the retailer has a su¢ ciently large space in his own store
and/or retailer js store, then he should obtain a prot that is higher than the prot with no
space exchange. That is, in order to entice retailer i to exchange his space with retailer j,
retailer j may need to allocate a su¢ ciently large space to retailer i.
4 Nash Equilibrium Space-Allocation Decisions
We now investigate the optimal allocation of each stores shelf space between two retailers in
the equilibrium. That is, we determine the optimal values of Sii and Sij in retailer is store
where Sii + Sij = Si, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. Since the total space in each store (i.e., Si)
is given, retailer i only needs to determine the value of Sii and allocates the remaining space
Sij = Si Sii to retailer j. To nd the optimal space decision, each retailer should maximize the
sum of his prots generated in two stores. Thus, the space allocation problem can be naturally
regarded as a simultaneous-movenon-cooperative game, and the two retailersoptimal space
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allocation decisions should be characterized by Nash equilibrium.
To solve the non-cooperative game and nd the Nash equilibrium, we need to rst analyze
each retailers best response i.e., the optimal space decision for a given space allocation decision
of the other retailer. Next, we begin by nding retailer is best space allocation decision for his
own store, assuming that retailer j decides to retain the space Sjj and allocate the space Sji to
retailer i.
4.1 The Best-Response Analysis
To implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i (i = 1; 2) uses the guest space Sji given
by retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6= i) to serve some or all product i consumers, and determines his
host space Sii 2 [0; Si] and allocate the space Sij = Si Sii to retailer j. Thus, to nd the best
response to retailer js space allocation decision, retailer i should nd the optimal host space
that maximizes his own prot. As discussed in Section 3, we calculate retailer is maximum
prot given the retailers host space and guest space, as shown in Table 3.
Next, we assume that the guest space Sji 2 [0; Sj] is given, and use our results in Table 3 to
nd the optimal host space Sii (best response) for retailer i. Because our analysis in Section 3
indicates that retailer is optimal pricing decisions depends on the comparison between ui and
ci + t, we consider the retailers optimal space allocation decision for the two cases: ui > ci + t
and ui  ci + t.
4.1.1 The Best Response when ui > ci + t
We now determine retailer is best space allocation decision, when the product i consumer
residing at the site of retailer js store can gain a positive net utility if he or she visits retailer
is store to buy product i (i.e., ui > ci + t).
Lemma 6 When ui > ci+t, retailer is optimal space allocation decision depends on the values
of Sji and the total space Si in his own store, as shown in Table 4. 
From the above lemma, we learn that, if either the total space Si in retailer is own store
or the retailers guest space Sji (allocated by retailer j) cannot be used to serve a half of B1
product 1 consumers, then retailer i should make his space allocation decision to serve a part
(rather than all) of Bi consumers. Otherwise, if both Si and Sji are large enough to serve a
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Conditions Optimal Space Decision
Sji
 Bi=2
Si  Bi[1 
(ui   ci)=(2t)]
Sii = min[Si; Bi=2],
Sij = [0; Si  Bi=2]+.
(All consumers buy.)
Si + Sji
 Bi
Si < Bi[1 
(ui   ci)=(2t)]
Sii = Si and S

ij = 0.
(Some consumers may not buy.)
Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]
 Sji < Bi=2
Sii = Bi   Sji,
Sij = Si  Bi + Sji.
(All consumers buy.)
Sji < Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]
Sii = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t),
Sij = Si  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t).
(Some consumers may not buy.)
Si + Sji < Bi
Sii = min[Bi(ui   ci)=(2t); Si],
Sij = [0; Si  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)]+.
(Some consumers may not buy.)
Table 4: Retailer is best-response space decision when ui > ci + t.
half of product i consumers, then the retailer should determine his host space such that all
consumers will buy in two stores. This may reect the fact that retailer i intends to serve all
product i consumers using his space in two stores. Thus, if retailer j allocates a su¢ ciently
large space to retailer i and the total space Si in retailer is store is also su¢ ciently large, then
retailer i should decide to retain a host space that is large enough to assure that he can serve
all consumers in two stores.
However, if retailer i cannot serve Bi=2 consumers in his guest space Sji, then he should not
retain a large host space to serve all consumers, which may be justied as follows: When the
guest space is so small that less than a half of consumers are willing to buy, retailer i should
have to use his host space to serve more than a half of Bi consumers if he intends to serve all
consumers in two stores. But, in order to sell more than Bi=2 units of product i in retailer
is own store, the retailer has to reduce his retail price to a low level, which may thus reduce
his total prot. Similarly, if Si is small, then retailer i should accept a small guest space from
retailer j and should not serve all consumers.
4.1.2 The Best Response when ui  ci + t
From Lemmas 3 and 5 we nd that, if ui  ci + t, then retailer is optimal prices in two stores
are the same as those when ui > ci + t and Sii + Sji < Bi. Thus, the retailers maximum prot
when ui  ci + t is the same as that when Sii + Sji < Bi in Table 3.
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Lemma 7 If ui  ci + t (i = 1; 2), then retailer is best-response space allocation decision is
the same as that when Si + Sji < Bi in last row of Table 4. 
As the above lemma indicates, retailer i (i = 1; 2) should make his space allocation decision
to serve a part of Bi product i consumers if the product i consumer at the site of retailer js
(j = 1; 2, j 6= i) store cannot enjoy a positive net utility when he or she buys in retailer is store,
i.e., ui  ci + t. For this case, if two retailers do not implement the space-exchange strategy,
then some consumers who are closer to the site of retailer j do not buy product i. After the
space exchange, retailer i may need to utilize his guest space to serve those consumers (who
do not buy before the space exchange). Note that, in the linear city, a half of total product
i consumers (i.e., Bi consumers) are closer to retailer js store, and they could prefer to buy
in retailer js rather than retailer is store. This means that, as a consequence of the space
exchange, retailer i may serve less consumers in his store and may thus raise the retail price in
his own store to increase his prot margin. In addition, to assure the retailers prot in retailer
js store, the retailer should not reduce his price for product i in retailer js store to a low level,
which may discourage some consumers from buying product i. Therefore, to maximize retailer
is total prot in two stores, the retailer may make his pricing and space allocation decisions
to only serve a part of Bi consumers.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium
We use our above best-response analysis for two retailers to nd the Nash equilibrium (SNii ; S
N
jj )
(i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j) for the non-cooperative game. Note that the guest space SNij and SNji in two
stores are computed as SNij = Si   SNii and SNji = Sj   SNjj ; and, after each retailer makes his or
her optimal space decision, the retailers optimal price is correspondingly determined using our
results in Section 3.
We nd from our best-response analysis that in some cases, a retailer may allocate zero
space to the other retailer. For example, if ui   ci > t, Si + Sji  Bi, Sji  Bi=2, and
Bi[1  (ui  ci)=(2t)]  Si  Bi=2, then retailer i should not allocate any space to retailer j, as
indicated by Lemma 6. Naturally, to implement the space-exchange strategy, each retailer must
allocate some nonzero space to the other retailer. Therefore, if a retailer does not allocate any
space to the other retailer, then two retailers should not consider the space-exchange strategy
but instead operate with no space exchange.
16
Proposition 3 In the Nash equilibrium, retailers 1 and 2 should decide to implement the
space-exchange strategy if and only if Si > max[Bi[1   (ui   ci)=(2t)]; Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)], for
i = 1; 2. 
In the above proposition, we note that, for retailer i (i = 1; 2), either [1   (ui   ci)=(2t)]
or (ui   ci)=(2t) must be greater than or equal to 1/2. That is, for the simultaneous-mover
game, the total shelf space Si in retailer is own store must be large enough to serve more
than a half of Bi product i consumers, in order to let retailer i have an incentive for the space
exchange with retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6= i). Thus, two retailers should have su¢ cient shelf space
in their own stores in order to implement the space-exchange strategy. Otherwise, they may
have no incentive for the space exchange in the game.
One may note that two retailers with small shelf space could also consider the space-exchange
strategy. For example, suppose that retailer i (i = 1; 2) can stock only two units of product
i in his store before the space exchange, i.e., Si = 2, for i = 1; 2. When two retailers do
not exchange shelf space, retailer i would set his price such that the two consumers who are
the closest to the retailer along the Hotelling line would nd it worthwhile to buy product
i. If two retailers exchange shelf space, then they may raise their prices without losing any
consumers, and their prots could thus be higher than those in the no space exchangecase.
This di¤ers from Proposition 3, which is justied as follows: Proposition 3 holds when two
retailers make their decisions in the non-cooperative game whereas the above discussion is based
on the assumption that two retailers jointly make their decisions in the cooperative setting. For
a detailed discussion, see online Appendix E. Note that we use the Hotelling model to analyze
the space-exchange problem; thus, Proposition 3 applies to the non-cooperative setting.
Since two retailers decide to exchange shelf space in the simultaneous-movegame if and
only if the non-zero space allocation decisions exist in Nash equilibrium, we next analyze our
non-cooperative space-exchange game to nd Nash equilibrium under the condition in Propo-
sition 3. We learn from our previous analysis that two retailers make their pricing and space
decisions according to whether or not all consumers for each product can enjoy a positive net
utility from buying at each end point (i.e., the site of each retailers store) of the linear city.
Accordingly, we should compare ui and ci + t for retailer i, in order to compute the Nash equi-
librium for the space-exchange problem. Hence, for our game analysis, we need to consider the
following three cases: (i) ui  ci + t, for i = 1; 2; (ii) ui > ci + t and uj  cj + t, for i; j = 1; 2,
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i 6= j; and (iii) ui > ci + t, for i = 1; 2.
Our best-response analysis indicates that, when ui > ci + t, retailer i has a number of
di¤erent optimal space decisions dependent on the space in his own store and his guest space.
Therefore, for Case (iii), there should be a number of possible Nash equilibria, which depend
on the total space in each retailers store. In order to facilitate our discussion, we rst consider
Case (i), and nd the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This is then followed by our discussion
by the remaining two cases.
4.2.1 Nash Equilibrium when ui  ci + t (i = 1; 2)
Using our best-response analysis in Section 4.1, we now solve the two-person non-cooperative
game to nd the Nash equilibrium for retailers 1 and 2.
Lemma 8 If ui  ci + t (i = 1; 2), then Nash equilibrium uniquely exists as SNii = Bi(ui  
ci)=(2t) and SNjj = Bj(uj   cj)=(2t), for j = 1; 2 and j 6= i. Retailer i should allocate the space
SNij = Si Bi(ui ci)=(2t) > 0 to retailer j, who allocates the space SNji = Sj Bj(uj cj)=(2t) >
0 to retailer i.
To implement the equilibrium space decision, retailer i should determine the corresponding
prices for product i in his own store and retailer js store as pNii = (ui + ci)=2 and p
N
ij =
ui   tSNji =Bi, respectively. 
From the above lemma, we nd that, to implement the space-exchange strategy, each retailer
allocates a nonzero space to the other retailer. As indicated by Lemma 7, retailer i (i = 1; 2)
should fully use his guest space SNji (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i) to serve some product i consumers who
are closer to retailer js store, respectively. However, according to our best-response analysis,
we note that two retailers do not serve all of their consumers, when they choose the Nash
equilibrium. Nevertheless, the two retailers prices in both host space and guest space are
higher than their prices determined when there is no space exchange, as shown in Lemma 5.
We also learn from Lemma 8 that each retailer may or may not set an identical price in
two stores. If the space allocated by retailer j to retailer i is SNji = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t), then
retailer is Nash equilibrium prices in two stores (i.e., pNii and p
N
ij ) will be identical. Because
SNji = Sj   Bj(ui   ci)=(2t), we nd that pNii = pNij if Sj = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t) + Bj(uj   cj)=(2t).
That is, if Sj equals the space that is needed to stock Bi(ui   ci)=(2t) units of product i and
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Bj(uj   cj)=(2t) units of product j, then retailer i should set an identical price (ui + ci)=2 for
product i in two stores. Otherwise, retailer i should determine di¤erent prices.
Moreover, two retailers can achieve higher prots compared with those before they exchange
shelf space, which means that they should have incentives to cooperate with the space-exchange
strategy.
4.2.2 Nash Equilibrium when ui > ci + t and uj  cj + t (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j)
We now consider the case where all product i (i = 1; 2) consumers can achieve a positive net
utility from buying in two stores (i.e., ui > ci + t) but some product j (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i)
consumers (e.g., the consumer residing at the site of a retailers store) cannot draw a positive
net utility from their purchases in a store (i.e., uj  cj + t).
Lemma 9 When ui > ci + t and uj  cj + t, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium, which depends on the value of Sj, as given in Table 5. 
Conditions Nash Equilibrium
Sj  Bi=2 +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t) SNii = Bi=2, SNjj = Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)] +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
 Sj  Bi=2 +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
SNii = Bi   Sj +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t),
SNjj = Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
Sj  Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]
+Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
SNii = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t),
SNjj = Bj(uj   cj)=(2t)
Table 5: Nash equilibrium when ui > ci + t and uj  cj + t, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
Similar to our analysis for Case (i) ui  ci + t (i = 1; 2), we can use Lemma 3 and 5 to
compute two retailerscorresponding optimal prices for each of three possible Nash equilibria
in Table 5. We nd that each retailers prices in two stores are both higher than the retailers
price before the space exchange. This means that implementing the space-exchange strategy
raises the retail prices. From Lemma 9 we nd that, if not all product j (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i)
consumers can enjoy a positive net utility, then the total space Sj in retailer js store impacts
two retailersNash equilibrium decisions. Moreover, whatever the value of Sj is, retailer js
Nash equilibrium space is always determined as Bj(uj   cj)=(2t). Using Table 5, we obtain
Figure 2 to show retailer is Nash equilibrium space decision SNii as a function of Sj.
If Sj is larger than or equal to Bi=2 +Bj(uj  cj)=(2t), then retailer j allocates a su¢ ciently
large guest space to retailer i who can then serve a half of product i consumers in retailer js
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Figure 2: The impact of the space Sj (j = 1; 2) on retailer is (i = 1; 2, i 6= j) Nash equilibrium
SNii when ui > ci + t and uj  cj + t.
store. According to Figure 2, we nd that retailer i should retain his host space SNii to serve the
other half of his consumers, in order to serve all Bi consumers. However, when Sj is reduced to
a value between Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)] +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t) and Bi=2 +Bj(uj   cj)=(2t), we learn
from Figure 2 that retailer i should increase his host space mainly because of the following fact:
When Sj decreases, retailer j allocates to retailer i a smaller guest space where retailer i cannot
serve a half of product i consumers. In order to fulll the demands of all Bi consumers in the
linear city, retailer i should keep a su¢ ciently large host space such that all of the consumers
who do not decide to buy in retailer js store are willing to shop in retailer is store.
When Sj is smaller than Bi[1  (ui  ci)=(2t)] +Bj(uj  cj)=(2t), retailer i will obtain a very
small guest space and have to serve a small number of product i consumers in retailer js store.
If retailer i still hopes to fulll all consumersdemands, then the retailer should keep a large host
space to serve most of his consumers. To assure that most consumers (especially those closer
to retailer js store) are willing to buy in retailer is store, retailer i should set a su¢ ciently low
retail price for product i in his host space, which, but, results in a low prot. Therefore, if Sj
is signicantly small, then retailer i should determine his host space as SNii = Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)
in order to guarantee his prot; and as a result, some product i consumers will not decide to
buy.
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4.2.3 Nash Equilibrium when ui > ci + t (i = 1; 2)
We now solve our non-cooperative game for Case (iii) where both product 1 consumers and
product 2 consumers can gain a positive net utility from buying in any store, i.e., ui > ci + t,
for i = 1; 2. The analysis for this case is much more complicated than the above two cases, and
there are many possible Nash equilibria. Thus, we only show the existence of Nash equilibrium
in the following theorem but the specic Nash equilibria are provided in online Appendix F.
Lemma 10 When ui > ci + t (i = 1; 2), then the corresponding Nash equilibrium (SNii ; S
N
jj )
(j = 1; 2 and j 6= i) must exist but it may or may not be unique. More specically, if the total
shelf space of two stores is not the same as that needed to exactly serve two retailersconsumers,
then Nash equilibrium for the game uniquely exists. Otherwise, the Nash equilibrium may not
be unique, which depends on consumersutilities and trip costs as well as the total available
shelf space in each retailers store. All possible Nash equilibria are given in Table 7 (see online
Appendix F). 
Similar to our analysis for the above cases, we can use Lemma 3 to compute two retailers
corresponding optimal prices for each possible Nash equilibrium given in Table 7. Moreover, we
nd from Lemma 3 that each retailers optimal prices in both the host space and the guest space
are higher than the retailers price when two retailers do not implement the space-exchange
strategy. That is, such a strategy induces two retailers to increase their prices.
5 Further Discussions
In the preceding sections, we analyzed the space-exchange problem and found the Nash equi-
librium pricing and space-allocation decisions. We now provide a further discussion on possible
changes of our major results in the following two settings: We rst consider a more realistic
case where there exists at least one commonconsumer who buys both products 1 and 2, and
then investigate whether or not our results will change in the setting where a retailers xed
cost of opening and sta¢ ng a new store is considered.
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5.1 Presence of Common Consumers
In our model, the set of product 1 consumers and the set of product 2 consumers are as-
sumed to be disjoint. This means that, at any point along the Hotelling line, the product 1
consumer is di¤erent from the product 2 consumer. Such an assumption may be applicable
to the space-exchange problem to some extent for the following reason: As indicated by the
practice of Waitrose and Boots and also by that of Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery,
the space-exchange strategy applies only when the cooperating retailersproducts are neither
substitutable nor complementary, e.g., Waitroses food vs. Bootss healthcare products; and,
Tim Hortonss doughnuts vs. Cold Stone Creamerys ice cream. Hence, it should be unusual
for any common consumer along the line to intentionally buy both products at the same time.
For this case, we could regard the common consumer as a product 1 consumerand also a
product 2 consumer,who are independent of each other; and then, our existing model could
be still used to analyze the space-exchange problem.
Despite the above argument, in reality, there may still exist some common consumer(s)
who intend to buy both products concurrently. However, if we relax our assumption on the
dependence of the product 1 consumers and the product 2 consumers, then our model may
become intractably complicated and we could not draw any meaningful analytical insights.
Therefore, we do not incorporate such common consumers into our model but subsequently
discuss how our major results would possibly change when a common consumer (who intends
to buy both products concurrently) exists.
We learn from our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 that, in the Nash equilibrium, retailer i
(i = 1; 2) may serve all of Bi consumers or may serve only a part of those consumers. Next, we
provide our discussion for three cases: (a) both retailers i and j (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i) serve all of
their consumers; (b) both retailers i and j do not serve all of their consumers; and (c) retailer
i serves all of Bi consumers but retailer j does not serve all of Bj consumers. For each case, we
discuss a representative situation, as shown in Figure 3, where (a), (b), and (c) represent Cases
(a), (b), and (c), respectively. [Our discussions on other situations in each case are similar to
our discussion for the representative situation.]
We begin by discussing the impacts of the presence of a common consumer in Case (a),
which corresponds to Figure 3(a) where the product i (i = 1; 2) consumers locating at the left
of ~xi buy in retailer 1s store and those consumers at the right of ~xi buy in retailer 2s store.
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Figure 3: The impacts of the presence of a common consumer on major results for three
representative situations.
As Figure 3(a) indicates, the product 1 and the product 2 consumers in zone 1 visit retailer 1s
store to buy products 1 and 2, respectively, when there is no common consumer. If we assume
that there is a common consumer at a point in zone 1, then the consumer will still buy both
products in retailer 1s store. That is, for Case (a), the presence of common consumers in zone
1 would not increase the demands for two products in each store; thus, it may not result in any
change in two retailerspricing and space-allocation decisions. Similarly, any common consumer
in zone 3 will decide to buy two products in retailer 2s store. This does not increase or decrease
the demands faced by two retailers in each store, and would not change two retailersdecisions.
If a common consumer is located in zone 2, then the total demand for each product in two
stores should be unchanged but the demands faced by two retailers in each store may di¤er
from those with no common consumer. Specically, if there is no common consumer in zone 2,
then the product 1 and the product 2 consumers will buy in di¤erent stores. But, if a common
consumer in zone 2 is closer to ~x2, then he or she may be likely to buy both products in retailer
1s store. As a result, compared with the no common consumercase, the demand for product
2 in retailer 1s store is increased by 1 unit and that in retailer 2s store is decreased by 1
unit, whereas the demand for product 1 in each store is not changed. Even though retailer 2
needs to sells one more unit in retailer 1s store, retailer 1 is unlikely to allocate one more space
to retailer 2 because retailer 1 should keep his host space to serve existing customers. If two
retailers have already used the total space S1, then retailer 2 may respond by increasing his
price p21 for product 2 in retailer 1s store but decreasing his price p22 for product 2 in his own
store, in order to movea consumer from retailer 1s store to retailer 2s store. On the other
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hand, if there is an excess space in retailer 1s store, then retailer 2 should take over one more
unit of the space to satisfy the demand by the common consumer; as a result, two retailers do
not change their pricing decisions.
Next, we discuss the impacts of the presence of a common consumer in Case (b), which
corresponds to Figure 3(b) where the product i (i = 1; 2) consumers residing at the left of
~xi1 and those at the right of ~xi2 buy in retailer 1s and retailer 2s stores, respectively. Using
our arguments for Case (a), a common consumer in zones 1 and 3 would have no impact on
two retailersdecisions; and, the presence of a common consumer in zone 2 would lead to an
increase in the demand faced by one or two retailers at a store. The retailers may change their
prices at two stores if there is no excess space at the store where the demand rises, or may
keep the prices unchanged and use the excess space otherwise. Similarly, we nd that, for Case
(c), there would be no change if a common consumer is in zones 1 and 3, but the existence of
a common consumer in zone 2 would result in the price changes at two stores when there is
no excess space. Summarizing our above discussion, we draw the implications as given in the
following remark.
Remark 3 If a consumer intends to buy both products 1 and 2, then the demand faced by one
or two retailers at a store may be increased and two retailers may respond by changing their
pricing and space-allocation decisions. Specically, the presence of a common consumer close
to a store is unlikely to change two retailersdecisions. However, if a common consumer resides
in a middle point between two stores, then one or two retailers may face an increasing demand
at a store, thereby increasing their prices if there is no excess space at the store or keeping
the prices unchanged but using the excess space. As a result, if a common consumer exists,
then two retailersprots could be increased. Moreover, our above discussion also implies that
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 should hold in the presence of common consumers. C
5.2 Presence of Fixed Costs
In actual practice, two retailers (e.g., Waitrose and Boots, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Cream-
ery) may be willing to exchange shelf space instead of opening their own new stores. A mo-
tivation for two retailers to exchange shelf space would be mainly attributed to the fact that
each retailer incurs a xed cost in opening and sta¢ ng a new store, but does not pay for such
a cost in exchanging his shelf space with the other retailer. We now examine whether or not
24
our major results would change if we consider xed costs in our Hotelling model. Suppose that
retailer i (i = 1; 2) will decide to (i) open a new store at retailer js site (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i), or
(ii) exchange shelf space with retailer j. Each retailer should choose one from the two options
(i) and (ii).
Noting that two retailersxed costs are independent of their pricing and space-allocation
decisions, we nd that, if each retailers store is su¢ ciently large, then incorporating such costs
into our model should not change two retailersdecisions, and exchanging shelf space should
result in a higher prot for each retailer compared with opening a new store. Otherwise, if
a retailers store is small, then the retailer cannot allot a su¢ ciently large space to the other
retailer, who may then respond by opening a new store instead of exchanging shelf space. Such
a result is in agreement with Proposition 3, which indicates that two retailers should decide
to implement the space-exchange strategy in Nash equilibrium, if and only if each retailers
total shelf space is large enough to serve more than a half of his consumers. In Section 4 we
perform our game analysis, assuming that each retailer has a su¢ ciently large store. Such an
assumption is compatible with the practice that the retailers exchanging shelf space include,
e.g., Waitrose, Boots, Tim Hortons, and Cold Stone Creamery. It thus follows that our results
in this paper do not change if we consider each retailers xed cost of opening and sta¢ ng a
new store.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots (and also, Tim Hortons and Cold
Stone Creamery) where these retailers exchange shelf space to increase their prots. We use the
Hotelling model to analyze a two-retailer problem. Before the space exchange, each consumer
can buy only in one store; but, after two retailers implement the space-exchange strategy, the
consumer can access each retailers product in two stores and thus visit a store closer to the
consumers location to buy.
We rst assume that two retailers do not exchange shelf space, and maximize each retailers
prot to nd the optimal price for the retailers product in his own store. Then, we determine
each retailers optimal prices in two stores given his host space and guest space under the space-
exchange strategy, and nd that the space-dependent prices are impacted by whether or not all
of the retailers consumers can enjoy a positive net utility from buying in any store.
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Using the optimal space-dependent price, we consider a non-cooperative game where each
retailer makes the space allocation decision for his own store to maximize the total prot in
two stores. We show that two retailers should decide to implement the space-exchange strategy
in the game, if and only if the total space in each retailers store is large enough to serve more
than a half of the retailers consumers. Nash equilibrium for the game may or may not uniquely
exist, depending on consumersutilities and trip costs as well as the total space in each store.
We also nd that, in the Nash equilibrium, each retailers prices in two stores may or may not
be identical but they are both higher than the retailers price before the space exchange, and
two retailersprots are higher than those before they implement the space-exchange strategy.
We also discuss possible changes of our major results when there exists a common consumer
who buys both products 1 and 2, and those when a retailers xed cost for opening and sta¢ ng
a new store is considered.
As we discuss in Section 1, the informational advantage and the risk reduction should be
the two main advantages of the space-exchange strategy. In this paper, we focus on consumers
increased choices and reduced trip costs, which should be the major advantage for the strategy.
The analysis of the informational advantage and the risk reduction for the space-exchange
problem would be a future research direction.
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Appendix A Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. We rst consider retailer 1s optimal pricing decision. We learn from
(2) that retailer 1s prot depends on the comparison between x1 = (u1  p1)=t and S1=B1. We
perform our analysis for the following two cases:
1. When S1  B1, retailer 1s prot function in (2) can be re-written as 1 = B1  (p1  
c1)x1 = B1 (p1  c1) (u1  p1)=t. The rst- and second-order derivatives of 1 w.r.t.
p1 are thus computed as,
@1
@p1
=
B1  (u1   2p1 + c1)
t
and
@21
@p21
=  2B1
t
.
Temporarily ignoring the constraint that u1   t  p1  u1, we nd that the optimal
price maximizing 1 is (u1 + c1)=2, which is smaller than or equal to u1 because u1  c1.
Considering the constraint that u1   t  p1  u1, we nd the optimal price for this case
as p1 = max[u1   t; (u1 + c1)=2].
Next, we calculate retailer 1s maximum prot. From the above, we nd that we should
compare (u1 + c1)=2 and u1   t to determine retailer 1s optimal price and compute the
corresponding maximum prot.
(a) If (u1+c1)=2  u1 t, or, c1+2t  u1, then retailer 1s optimal price is p1 = (u1+c1)=2
and his maximum prot is calculated as, 1 = B1  [(u1 + c1)=2  c1] [u1   (u1 +
c1)=2]=t = B1  (u1   c1)2=(4t).
(b) If c1 + 2t  u1, then retailer 1s optimal price is p1 = u1  t and his maximum prot
is found as 1 = B1  (u1   t  c1).
2. When S1 < B1, we need to compare x1 and S1=B1 to determine the optimal retail price
for this case. Specically,
(a) When x1  S1=B1, or, p1  u1   tS1=B1, retailer 1s prot function can be re-
written as 1 = B1  (p1   c1)  (u1   p1)=t. Noting that S1=B1 < 1, we nd that
u1   tS1=B1 > u1   t and the maximization constraint for this case thus becomes
u1   tS1=B1  p1  u1. Using our argument for the rst case, we nd the optimal
price for this case as max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   tS1=B1].
(b) When x1  S1=B1, or, p1  u1 tS1=B1, retailer 1s prot function can be re-written
as 1 = B1  (p1   c1)  S1=B1, which is increasing in p1. Therefore, for this case,
the optimal retail price is u1   tS1=B1.
According to the above, we nd that, when S1 < B1, retailer 1s optimal price is deter-
mined as p1 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   tS1=B1]. Next, we calculate retailer 1s maximum
prot.
(a) If (u1 + c1)=2  u1  tS1=B1, or, c1 + 2tS1=B1  u1, then retailer 1s optimal price is
p1 = (u1 + c1)=2, and his maximum prot is calculated as, 1 = B1  [(u1 + c1)=2 
c1] [u1   (u1 + c1)=2]=t = B1  (u1   c1)2=4.
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(b) If c1 + 2tS1=B1  u1, then retailer 1s optimal price is p1 = u1   tS1=B1 and his
maximum prot is 1 = (u1   tS1=B1   c1) S1.
We can similarly compute retailer 2s optimal price and maximum prot. The lemma is
thus proved.
Proof of Lemma 2. We rst perform our analysis for retailer 1. As Remark 1 indicates, there
are two cases in which retailer 1 can set his prices in two stores to a¤ect consumersdemands.
We compute the retailers optimal prices for the two cases as follows:
1. Retailer 1 determines his retail prices (p11; p12) under the constraint that p21+p11  2u1 t.
As discussed in Remark 1, for this case, all consumers must have a non-negative utility
and thus decide to buy from retailer 1. Because the demands faced by retailer 1 in two
stores are D11 = B1(p12  p11 + t)=(2t) and D12 = B1(p11  p12 + t)=(2t), we can construct
retailer 1s prot for this case as,
1 = B1(p11   c1)p12   p11 + t
2t
+B1(p12   c1)p11   p12 + t
2t
. (4)
Retailer 1s maximization problem is thus developed as, max1, s.t. p12 + p11  2u1   t
and  t  p12  p11  t. Note that the second constraint is involved because, as discussed
previously, all of B1 consumers are uniformly distributed between the sites of retailers 1
and 2.
The rst-, second-order, and cross-partial derivatives of 1 w.r.t. p11 and p12 are calculated
as,
@1
@p11
= B1
2(p12   p11) + t
2t
,
@21
@p211
=  B1
t
< 0;
@1
@p12
= B1
2(p11   p12) + t
2t
,
@21
@p212
=  B1
t
< 0;
@21
@p21@p11
=
B1
t
> 0.
It is easy to show the Hessians negative deniteness. Thus, the prot 1 in (4) is jointly
concave in the prices p11 and p12. Setting the rst-order derivatives to zero and solving
them, we have the optimal retail prices for the rst case as, p12 = p11 = (2u1   t)=2 =
u1   t=2, which satisfy the constraints that p12 + p11 + t  2u1 and  t  p12   p11  t.
The corresponding demands in retailer 1s own store and retailer 2s store are then cal-
culated as D11 = D12 = B1=2, respectively. Moreover, retailer 1s maximum prots in
the two stores are both obtained as B1 (u1   c1   t=2) =2; and, the retailers total prot
is computed as 1 = B1 (u1   c1   t=2).
2. Retailer 1 determines his prices p11 and p12 such that p11 + p12  2u1   t. We learn from
Remark 1 that, for this case, some consumer(s) may not buy from retailer 1, who may
thus partially satisfy the demand B1(2u1   p11   p12)=t. The demands for product 1 in
two stores are D11 = B1(u1 p11)=t and D12 = B1(u1 p12)=t; it then follows that retailer
1s prot is computed as,
1 = B1(p11   c1) u1   p11
t
+B1(p12   c1) u1   p12
t
. (5)
Retailer 1 should nd his optimal retail prices by solving the following maximization
problem: max1, s.t. p11 +p12 + t  2u1 and  t  p12 p11  t. The rst-, second-order,
2
Pricing and Space-Allocation Decisions Online Supplements
and cross-partial derivatives of 1 w.r.t. p11 and p12 are calculated as,
@1
@p11
= B1
u1 + c1   2p11
t
,
@21
@p211
=  2B1
t
< 0;
@1
@p12
= B1
u1 + c1   2p12
t
,
@21
@p212
=  2B1
t
< 0;
@21
@p12@p11
= 0.
It is easy to prove that the Hessians deniteness is negative, and retailer 1s prot 1
in (5) is jointly concave in p11 and p12. However, we cannot immediately compute the
optimal prices by solving the rst-order conditions (i.e., @1=@p11 = 0 and @1=@p12 = 0),
because, otherwise, the demand in terms of optimal prices may be greater than the total
demand B1, which is specied as follows:
Temporarily ignoring the above concern regarding the demand, we solve the equations
that @1=@p11 = 0 and @1=@p12 = 0 to make retailer 1s optimal pricing decisions as
p11 = p12 = (u1 + c1)=2. The resulting demands in two stores are thus computed as
D11 = D12 = B1(u1   c1)=(2t); the total demand is D11 + D12 = B1(u1   c1)=t, which
may be greater than B1, depending on the values of u1, c1, and t. Next, we consider the
comparison between u1 and c1 + t to determine retailer 1s optimal prices.
(a) If u1  c1 + t, then D11 + D12  B1; this means that retailer 1 should adopt the
optimal prices p11 = p12 = (u1 + c1)=2, which satisfy the constraints that p11 + p12 
2u1   t and  t  p12   p11  t. The retailer may thus fulll the demands of some
rather than all product 1 consumers. As a result, retailer 1s prots in two stores are
both calculated as B1(u1   c1)2=(4t), and his total prot is 1 = B1(u1   c1)2=(2t).
(b) If u1 > c1 + t, then D11 + D12 > B1, which implies that the optimal prices are too
low and retailer 1 can raise his prices to increase his prot margin without losing any
consumer. Since retailer 1 will satisfy all B1 consumers, similar to Case 1, we can
nd his decisions as p11 = p12 = u1   t=2, which is higher than the price (u1 + c1)=2
(that is optimal when u1  c1 + t). The demands in two stores are then computed
as D11 = D12 = B1=2, and the total demand is D11 +D12 = B1. Retailer 1s prots
in two stores are both computed as B1(u1   c1   t=2), and his total prot is thus
1 = B1(u1   c1   t=2).
Note that, if the retail prices p11 and p12 are both reduced to retailer 1s acquisition cost
c1 and the product 1 consumer residing at the location 1 (i.e., retailer 2s store) intends
to buy in retailer 1s store, then the consumer enjoys the utility u1 but incurs the cost
c1 + t. The above condition that u1  c1 + t means that the product 1 consumer at the
site of retailer 2s store has a non-positive net utility if he or she goes to retailer 1s store
to buy a unit of product 1.
We can similarly perform our analysis for retailer 2. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3. We rst analyze retailer 1s optimal pricing decisions. We consider
two cases i.e., S11 + S21  B1 and S11 + S21 < B1 to determine retailer 1s optimal pricing
decisions. We rst investigate the case that S11 +S21  B1, which means that retailer 1s total
space S11 + S21 in two stores is large enough to stock B1 units of products. When S11 + S21 
B1, we need to consider the following three scenarios: (i) S11  B1=2 and S21  B1=2; (ii)
S11 < B1=2 and S21 > B1=2; and (iii) S11 > B1=2 and S21 < B1=2. For the scenario (i), we
learn from Lemma 2 that the optimal prices are determined as p11 = p12 = u1   t=2, and the
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resulting demands in two stores are both equal to B1=2.
Next we consider the scenario (ii), where, in retailer 1s own store, retailer 1 cannot satisfy a
half of the total demand. This means that, even though the retailer can carry su¢ cient number
of product 1 in two stores, the retailers optimal pricing decisions under the capacity constraint
may not result in the fulllment of the total demand B1. Recall from Remark 1 that retailer 1
may determine his prices such that p11 + p12  2u1   t or may make his pricing decisions such
that p11 + p12  2u1   t. Next, we maximize retailer 1s prot when p11 + p12  2u1   t and
maximize that when p11 + p12  2u1   t, and then compare the maximum prots to nd the
optimal prices for the retailer.
1. If p11 + p12  2u1   t, then, according to Remark 1, all product 1 consumers should buy
from retailer 1 in either retailer 1s store or retailer 2s store; and, the demands faced
by retailer 1 in two stores are D11 = B1(p12   p11 + t)=(2t) and D12 = B1(p11   p12 +
t)=(2t). Temporarily ignoring the capacity (space) constraint, we develop the retailers
prot function as,
1 = B1(p11   c1)p12   p11 + t
2t
+B1(p12   c1)p11   p12 + t
2t
=  B1 (p12   p11)
2
2t
+B1
p11 + p12
2
 B1c1,
which is decreasing in the di¤erence between p12 and p11 but increasing in p11 + p12. This
means that retailer 1 should consider the following two strategies to make his optimal
pricing decisions: (i) The di¤erence between retailer 1s prices in two stores should be as
small as possible; and (ii) The value p11 +p12 should be as large as possible. Since p11 and
p12 should be determined such that p11 + p12  2u1   t, the optimal prices should satisfy
the equality that p11 + p12 = 2u1  t. Because the di¤erent between p12 and p11 should be
as small as possible, the di¤erence between D11 and D12 should be minimized under the
constraints that S11 < B1=2 and S21 > B1=2. Therefore, the retailer needs to determine
his prices such that the total demand for product 1 in retailer 1s and retailer 2s stores
are equal to S11 and B1   S11, respectively. That is, solving the following equations:
B1(p12   p11 + t)=(2t) = S11,
p11 + p12 = 2u1   t,
we can nd the retailers prices as p11 = u1  tS11=B1 and p12 = u1  t(1 S11=B1), which
satises the constraint that  t  p12   p11  t.
2. If retailer 1s pricing decisions are made such that p11 + p12  2u1   t, then some con-
sumer(s) may not buy from retailer 1, who may thus only satisfy a part of the total
demand B1. The retailers prots generated in retailer 1s and retailer 2s stores are
written as,
(p11   c1)min[S11; B1(u1   p11)=t] and (p12   c1)min[B1   S11; B1(u1   p12)=t].
According to Lemma 2, the optimal price p11 maximizing B1(p11  c1)(u1  p11)=t should
be equal to (u1 + c1)=2, and the resulting demand for product 1 in retailer 1s store is
B1(u1   c1)=(2t), which is greater than B1=2 because u1 > c1 + t. Since S11 < B1=2,
the retailer should increase the price p11 from (u1 + c1)=2 to a value such that the total
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demand in retailer 1s store i.e., B1(u1   p11)=t is equal to the available number S11.
Solving the equation that B1(u1   p11)=t = S11 gives the price p11 = u1   tS11=B1, which
is greater than (u1 + c1)=2 since u1 > c1 + t.
Because of the constraint that p11 + p12 + t  2u1, the price p12 should be greater than
or equal to u1   t(1  S11=B1), which occurs if and only if the total demand for product
1 in retailer 2s store that is, B1(u1   p12)=t is smaller than or equal to the available
quantity B1 S11. Therefore, retailer 1s prot generated in retailer 2s store is calculated
as B1(p12 c1)(u1 p12)=t, which should be maximized subject to p12  u1 t(1 S11=B1)
and  t  p12   p11  t. Lemma 2 indicates that the optimal price p12 maximizing
B1(p12   c1)(u1   p12)=t is (u1 + c1)=2. It thus follows that the optimal price p12 is
determined as p12 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   t(1   S11=B1)]. Because S11 < B1=2 and
p12  u1   t(1  S11=B1), we nd that p12   p11   t(1  2S11=B1) >  t. Note from the
above that (u1 + c1)=2 < u1  tS11=B1; thus, p12 p11  0 < t. Hence, the constraint that
 t  p12   p11  t is satised.
In conclusion, we nd that, if S11 + S21  B1 but S11 < B1=2, retailer 1s optimal prices in
his own store and retailer 2s store are p11 = u1  tS11=B1 and p12 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1  t(1 
S11=B1)]. Similarly, if S11 + S21  B1 but S21 < B1=2, retailer 1s optimal prices in his own
store and retailer 2s store are p11 = max[(u1 +c1)=2; u1 t(1 S21=B1)] and p12 = u1 tS21=B1.
Next, we compute retailer 1s optimal prices when the retailers total space S11 +S21 cannot
stock B1 units of product 1, i.e., S11+S21 < B1. For this scenario, the retailers prots in retailer
1s and retailer 2s stores are (p11 c1)min[S11; B1(u1 p11)=t] and (p12 c1)min[S21; B1(u1 
p12)=t]. If p11  u1 tS11=B1, then retailer 1s prot in his own store becomes B1(p11 c1)S11,
which is increasing in p11. Therefore, the optimal price p11 maximizing B1(p11   c1)  S11 is
equal to u1   tS11=B1. On the other hand, if p11  u1   tS11=B1, then retailer 1s prot in his
own store becomes B1(p11 c1)(u1 p11)=t, which is maximized at the point p11 = (u1 +c1)=2.
Therefore, retailer 1s optimal price p11 is obtained as p11 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   tS11=B1].
Similarly, the retailers optimal price p12 is obtained as p12 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   tS21=B1].
Similar to the above analysis for retailer 1, we can nd retailer 2s optimal prices. This
proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. We rst consider the price comparison for retailer 1, which will similarly
apply to retailer 2. We nd from Lemma 1 that, when the two retailers do not exchange shelf
space, retailer 1s optimal price p1 depends on S1; and we note from Lemma 3 that retailer 1s
optimal price p11 and p

12 under the space-exchange strategy depend on the values of S11 and
S21. Thus, for this proof, we have to compare any pair of optimal prices in two settings.
1. If S11 + S21  B1, S11  B1=2, and S21  B1=2, then p11 and p12 are obviously greater
than u1   t. We also nd that u1   t=2 > (u1 + c1)=2 because u1 > c1 + t. Therefore,
p11 = p

12 > p

1 = max((u1 + c1)=2; u1  t), which applies when S1  B1. We then consider
the comparison when S1 < B1. Because S1  S11  B1=2, u1   tS1=B1 < u1   t=2 =
p11 = p

12. That is, for this case, p

11 = p

12 > p

1.
2. If S11 + S21  B1, S11 < B1=2, and S21 > B1=2, then we can easily show that p11 > p1.
However, p12 may or may not be greater than p

1. More specically, when S1  B1, p12 >
p1; but, when S1 < B1, p

12 may or may not be greater than p

1. If S1  B1(u1   c1)=(2t),
then, as Lemma 1 indicates, p1 is equal to (u1 + c1)=2 or u1   t, which is smaller than
p12. Otherwise, if S1 < B1(u1   c1)=(2t), then p1 = u1   tS1=B1. Therefore, a su¢ cient
condition under which p12  p1 can be found as u1   t(1   S11=B1)  u1   tS1=B1, or,
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S11 + S1  B1.
3. If S11 + S21  B1, S11 > B1=2, and S21 < B1=2, then we nd that p12 > p1. Moreover,
because S1 + S21  S11 + S21  B1, 1  S21=B1  S1=B1 and p11  p1.
4. If S11 + S21 < B1, then p11 > p

1; but, p

12 may or may not be greater than p

1. Similar to
the above proof for item 2, we nd that, for this case, a su¢ cient condition under which
p12  p1 is found as, S21  S1.
Similarly, we can compare the prices for retailer 2. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. We consider the decisions for retailer 1 in this proof, since those for
retailer 2 are similar. If S11  B1(u1   c1)=2t and S21  B1(u1   c1)=2t, then retailer 1 should
not serve all product 1 consumers, as suggested by Lemma 2, and his prices is determined as
p11 = p12 = (u1 + c1)=2.
However, if the space allocated to retailer 1 in his own store is smaller than B1(u1 c1)=(2t),
i.e., S11 < B1(u1   c1)=(2t), then the retailer should increase his price p11 from (u1 + c1)=2 to
the value that can be obtained by solving the equation that B1(u1   p11)=t = S11. That is, if
S11 < B1(u1   c1)=(2t), then retailer 1s price should determined as p11 = u1   tS11=B1, which
is greater than (u1 + c1)=2 because S11 < B1(u1   c1)=(2t). Note that, if S11  B1(u1   c1)=2t,
then (u1 + c1)=2  u1   tS11=B1. Therefore, we conclude that, when u1  c1 + t, retailer 1s
price for product 1 in his own store is p11 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1  tS11=B1]. Similarly, the retail
price in retailer 2s store is obtained as p12 = max[(u1 + c1)=2; u1   tS21=B1]. For the price
comparison, see the proof of Lemma 4. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6. In this proof, we consider retailer 1s best-response decisions. Retailer
2s decisions similarly follows. From Lemmas 3 and 5 and Table 3, we nd that retailer 1s
optimal pricing decision and corresponding maximum prot depend on the values of S11 and
S21. Note that retailer 1s guest space S21 may be greater than, equal to, or smaller than B1=2;
and, retailer 1s decision S11 cannot exceed his total space S1, which may be greater than or
may be smaller than B1=2. Therefore, we have to consider the following scenarios:
1. If S1 + S21  B1, then retailer 1 is able to serve all of B1 product 1 consumers. However,
the optimal value of S11 depends on the value of S21, as indicated by Table 3. We consider
two possibilities: S21  B1=2 and S21 < B1=2. If S21  B1=2, then we learn from Table
3 that, when S11  B1=2, retailer 1s maximum prot is 11  B1 (u1   c1   t=2); when
S11 < B1=2, the retailers maximum prot is 21 or 
3
1, which depends on the comparison
between u1 and c1 + 2t(1  S11=B1).
Temporarily ignoring the value of S1, we learn from the proof of Corollary 1 that 31 
21 < 
1
1; and, to maximize 
3
1, S11 must be determined as S11 = B1[1   (u1   c1)=(2t)].
Note that 31 = 
2
1 when S11 = B1[1   (u1   c1)=(2t)]. Hence, if S1 + S21  B1 and
S21  B1=2, then retailer 1s optimal decision is given as follows:
(a) If S1  B1=2, then the retailers optimal host space is S11 = B1=2 and the space
allocated to retailer 2 is calculated as S12 = S1   B1=2. In addition, the retailer
should only use the guest space B1=2 for his sale in retailer 2 store. All of B1
product 1 consumers are served when S1  B1=2.
(b) If S1 < B1=2, then the retailers optimal decision is dependent on the comparison
between S1 and B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]. More specically, if B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)] 
S1 < B1=2, then retailer 1s prot 21 is increasing in S11. Therefore, his optimal
host space is S11 = S1, which means that the retailer does not allocate any space to
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retailer 2. Retailer 1 should accept the guest space (B1   S1), which is smaller than
or equal to S21 because S1 + S21  B1. All of B1 product 1 consumers are served
when B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]  S1 < B1=2.
Otherwise, if S1 < B1[1   (u1   c1)=(2t)], then retailer 1s prot 31 is increasing
in S11 and the retailer should thus determine his optimal host space as S11 = S1.
However, we nd from Theorems 3 and 5 and Table 3 that the retailers optimal
price in retailer 2s store is p12 = (u1 + c1)=2 and the resulting sales in his guest
space is B1(u1   c1)=(2t), which is smaller than B1   S1. Thus, when S1 < B1[1  
(u1  c1)=(2t)], the retailer only needs the guest space B1(u1  c1)=(2t) and does not
serve all consumers.
If S1 + S21  B1 but S21 < B1, then Table 3 indicates that retailer 1s maximum prot
depends on his guest space in retailer 2s store. Similar to our above discussion when
S1 < B1=2, we nd that, if B1[1   (u1   c1)=(2t)]  S21 < B1=2, then retailer 1 should
accept the space S21 given by retailer 2, and he should determine his optimal host space
as S11 = B1   S21 and allocate the space S12 = S1   B1 + S21 to retailer 2. As a result,
the retailer serves all of B1 product 1 consumers. If S21 < B1[1   (u1   c1)=(2t)], then
retailer 1 still accepts the guest space S21, but determines his optimal host space as
S11 = B1(u1   c1)=(2t) and allocates to retailer 2 the space S12 = S1  B1(u1   c1)=(2t).
2. If S1+S21 < B1, then retailer 1 cannot serve all of B1 product 1 consumers. We learn from
the proof of Lemma 3 that retailer 1s optimal host space should be S11 = min[B1(u1  
c1)=(2t); S1]. The retailer should allocate S12 = S1 S11 = S1 min[B1(u1  c1)=(2t); S1].
Similarly, retailer 1 only accepts the space min[B1(u1   c1)=(2t); S21] from retailer 2.
Summarizing the above and similarly analyzing the best response for retailer 2, we have the
lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is the same as that for the case of Si + Sji < Bi (i; j = 1; 2
and i 6= j) in Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 8. Since Si > max[Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]; Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)], for i = 1; 2, we
nd from Lemma 7 that retailer is best-response space decision is Bi(ui   c1)=(2t). When two
retailers retain their host shelf space in Nash equilibrium, we can nd that, to implement the
space-exchange strategy, retailer i allocates the space SNij = Si   SNii = Si  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t) to
retailer j (j = 1; 2 and j 6= i), who allocates the space SNji = Sj SNjj = Sj Bj(uj  cj)=(2t) to
retailer i. Note that SNij > 0 and S
N
ji > 0 because of the condition in Proposition 3, under which
two retailers should decide to exchange shelf space. Then, using Lemma 5, we can compute
two retailerscorresponding optimal prices as given in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 9. To facilitate our proof, we consider the case that u1 > c1 + t and
u2  c2 + t, and nd the corresponding Nash equilibrium. According to Lemma 7, we nd
that, if u2  c2 + t, then retailer 2s optimal space decision S22 is the same as that when
S2 + S12 < B2 in Table 4. That is, for this case, retailer 2s optimal space decisions is always
S22 = B2(u2   c2)=(2tr2); see Figure 4(a). Using our best-response analysis, we draw Figure
4(b) to show retailer 1s best space decision S11 given retailer 2s decision S22.
Since the line S22 = B2(u2   c2)=(2tr2) in Figure 4(a) may intersect with each of three line
segments in Figure 4(b), there are three possible unique Nash equilibria, as given in Table 5.
Replacing 1 and 2 with i and j (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j), we prove this lemma.
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Figure 4: Two retailersbest-response space decisions when u1 > c1 + t and u2  c2 + t. Figure
(a) and (b) indicate retailer 2s and retailer 1s best responses, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 10. We draw Figure 5 to show two retailersbest responses. To nd Nash
equilibrium, we need to discuss where two retailersbest-response functions intersect, because
the intersection point represents a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 5: Two retailers best-response space decisions when u1 > c1 + t and u2 > c2 + t.
Specically, Figure (a) indicates retailer 2s best space decision S22 given retailer 1s decision
S11, and Figure (b) shows retailer 1s best space decision S11 given retailer 2s decision S22.
As Figure 5 indicates, each retailers best response is a step function consisting of three
segments. Therefore, we have to consider 13 scenarios, as shown in Figure 6. For each scenario,
we can calculate the corresponding Nash equilibrium, which is represented by the intersection
of two retailersbest-response functions in Figure 6. For our solution, see Table 7 in online
Appendix F. This proves the lemma.
Appendix B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. This proposition follows Lemmas 4 and 5. That is, for both
the case that ui > ci + t and the case that ui  ci + t, if two retailers cooperate under the
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Figure 6: Nash equilibria in 13 scenarios. Note that the solid and the dashed step functions
represent retailer 2s and retailer 1s best responses, respectively.
space-exchange strategy, retailer is prices in two stores (i.e., pi1 and p

i2) must be higher than
the retailers price pi when two retailers do not exchange shelf space.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemmas 3 and 5, we learn that, if two retailers exchange
shelf space, then each retailer may charge di¤erent prices in two stores. For example, as Lemma
3 indicates, pii = ui   tSii=Bi is di¤erent from pij = max[(ui + ci)=2; ui   t(1  Sii=Bi)], when
ui > ci + t, Sii + Sji  Bi, Sii < Bi=2, and Sji > Bi=2. This proposition is thus proved.
Proof of Proposition 3. The space-exchange strategy is implemented in the simultaneous-
movegame if and only if each retailer decides to allocate non-zero shelf space to the other
retailer in Nash equilibrium. According to our best-response analysis, we nd that, for the
simultaneous-movegame, two retailers should not exchange shelf space if and only if one or
more of the following six things happen: (i) Si  Bi=2; (ii) Si  Bi[1  (ui  ci)=(2t)]; (iii) Si 
Bi(ui  ci)=(2t); (iv) Sj  Bj=2; (v) Sj  Bj[1  (uj   cj)=(2t)]; and (vi) Sj  Bj(uj   cj)=(2t).
Note that
max[Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]; Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)] > Bi=2, for i = 1; 2.
It thus follows that, in Nash equilibrium, two retailers decide to exchange shelf space if and
only if Si > max[Bi[1  (ui   ci)=(2t)]; Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)].
Appendix C Detailed Discussion for Remark 1
We nd from (3) that a product i (i = 1; 2) consumer has no di¤erence between buying in
the two stores if u^xi1 = u^xi2, or, x^i  (pi2   pi1 + t)=2t. That is, the product i consumer at
location x^i can obtain the same utility when he or she buys in retailer 1s or retailer 2s store.
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As discussed in Section 2, because the Bi product i consumers are uniformly distributed along
the linear city between the two retailersstores (i.e., between the end points 0 and 1), retailer
i should make his pricing decision (pi1; pi2) such that 0  x^i  1, or,  t  pi2   pi1  t. In
addition, whether or not any consumer residing between the two retailersstores buys from a
store depends on the condition that u^xi  0. According to (3), we nd that, given the retail
price pi1, any consumer who is located at x  x^i1  (ui  pi1)=t should visit retailer 1s store at
the end point 0 to buy a unit of product i. In order to e¤ectively serve product i consumers,
retailer i should make his pricing decision pi1 such that x^i1  0, or, pi1  ui. Similarly, given
the retail price pi2, any consumer at the location x  x^i2  (pi2 + t  ui)=t should buy product i
from retailer i at retailer 2s store. Retailer is price pi2 for product i in retailer 2s store should
be smaller than or equal to ui i.e., pi2  ui so as to assure that x^i2  1.
Noting that x^i1 + x^i2  2x^i, we nd that, as Figure 7 indicates, either of the two following
cases happens: (i) x^i1  x^i and x^i2  x^i; or, (ii) x^i1  x^i and x^i2  x^i. Accordingly, we consider
the following two cases to compute the demands faced by retailer i in two retailersstores.
Figure 7: The demands faced by retailer i (i = 1; 2) in two retailersstores.
1. If x^i1  x^i, or, pi1 + pi2  2ui   t, then x^i2  x^i. We learn from Figure 7(a) that
the product i consumers between the point 0 and the point x^i1 can gain a non-negative
utility from buying in retailer 1store, and those consumers between the point x^i2 and
the point 1 have a non-negative utility from buying in retailer 2s store. For this case,
all of Bi product i consumersnet utilities must be non-negative when they buy in either
retailer 1s or retailer 2s store, and these consumers should be thus willing to complete
transactions with retailer 1. We also nd that any consumer residing between the points
x^i2 and x^i1 can draw a non-negative utility from purchasing from both retailer 1s and
retailer 2s stores. Such a consumer should choose a store where his or her net utility
is higher. Therefore, as Figure 7(a) indicates, any product i consumer residing between
the end point 0 and the point x^i should buy from retailer 1s store, and any product 1
consumer between x^i and the end point 1 should buy from retailer 2s store. Therefore,
the demands faced by retailer i in the two stores are computed as,
Di1 = Bi
pi2   pi1 + t
2t
and Di2 = Bi
pi1   pi2 + t
2t
.
It thus follows that, if retailer i makes his pricing decision (pi1; pi2) such that pi1 + pi2 
2ui   t, then retailer i should serve all consumers in the market.
2. If x^i2  x^i, or, pi1 + pi2  2ui   t, then x^i1  x^i. Similar to the rst case, we note from
Figure 7(b) that any consumer residing between the points x^i1 and x^i2 cannot draw a non-
negative utility from shopping in each store, and should be thus unwilling to buy from
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retailer 1. This means that, for this case, some consumer(s) may not decide to purchase
product i. Figure 7(b) indicates that only consumers between the points 0 and x^i1 should
buy in retailer 1s store, and only consumers between x^i2 and 1 should buy in retailer 2s
store. The demands faced by retailer i in the two stores are thus computed as,
Di1 = Bi
ui   pi1
t
and Di2 = Bi
ui   pi2
t
.
The total demand faced by retailer i is thus Bi(2ui   pi1   pi2)=t; this means that, if
retailer is prices (pi1; pi2) are determined such that pi1 + pi2  2ui  t, then he shall only
serve (2ui   pi1   pi2)=t (rather than all) of Bi consumers in the market.
From the above we nd that all product i consumers buy when x^i1  x^i whereas some
consumer(s) may not buy when x^i2  x^i. Note that, if pi1 + pi2 = 2ui   t, then x^i1 = x^i2 = x^i,
and the demands for the above two cases are the same, which means that all consumers will
buy but no consumer can enjoy a non-negative utility from buying from both stores.
Appendix D Proof of Corollary 1
We rst compare the prots for retailer 1. For this corollary, we should compare the prot
given in Table 3 and that given in Lemma 1. As Lemma 1 indicates, retailer 1s maximum
prot when two retailers do not exchange shelf space is dependent on the value of the total
space S1 in retailer 1s store; but, we nd from Table 3 that, when two retailers implement
the space-exchange strategy, retailer 1s maximum prot depends on the values of S11 and S21.
This means that, for each prot in Lemma 1, we have to compare it with any prot in Table
3. For example, if S1  B1, then Lemma 1 indicates that retailer 1s maximum prot with no
space exchange is either B1  (u1   c1)2=(4t) (when c1 + 2t  u1) or B1  (u1   t  c1) (when
c1 + 2t  u1). For this case, under the space-exchange strategy, the retailers maximum prot
could be any value of i1 (i = 1; : : : ; 8).
1. If S1  B1 and c1 + t < u1  c1 + 2t, then retailer 1s maximum prot with no space
exchange is 1 = B1  (u1   c1)2=(4t). It is easy to nd that 31, 51, 71, and 81 are all
greater than 1. Next, we need to consider 
1
1, 
2
1, 
4
1, and 
6
1.
We rst compare 11, 
2
1, and 
3
1. It is easy to note that 
2
1 < B1(u1   t   c1) + B1t(1  
S11=B1) because S11 < B1=2. Furthermore, we have,
B1(u1   t  c1) +B1t(1  S11=B1) = B1(u1   tS11=B1   c1) < B1(u1   t=2  c1) = 11,
which means that 21 < 
1
1. In fact, we can easily show that, when S11 = B1=2, 
2
1 arrives
to its maximum value that is equal to 11. In addition, we nd that 
3
1 is maximized
when S11=B1 = (u1   c1)=(2t). However, the retailer cannot choose the space S11 such
that S11=B1 = (u1   c1)=(2t), because of the following fact: If u1   c1 > 2t, then u1 >
c1 + 2t(1   S11=B1) and, as Table 3 indicates, retailer 1s prot is 21 rather than 31.
If u1   c1  2t, then retailer 1s prot is 31 only when u1  c1 + 2t(1   S11=B1), or,
S11=B1  1  (u1 c1)=(2t). Noting that 1  (u1 c1)=(2t) < 1=2 and (u1 c1)=(2t) > 1=2
because u1   c1 > t, we nd that the prot 31 is increasing in S11 when S11 2 [0; B1(1 
(u1   c1)=(2t))], and it thus follows that when S11 = B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)], 31 arrives to
its maximum 21, which is smaller than 
1
1, as argued above.
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Since 11 > 
2
1  31, we nd that both 11 and 21 are greater than 1. Similarly, we can also
show that 41  51; thus, 41 is greater than 1. However, 61 may or may not be greater
than 1. Noting that 
6
1  (S11 + S21)(u1   c1)=2, we can derive a su¢ cient condition
under which 61  1 as S11 + S21  B1(u1   c1)=(2t), or, S11 + S21  B1(u1   c1)=(2t).
2. If S1  B1 and u1  c1 + 2t, then retailer 1s maximum prot with no space exchange is
1 = B1  (u1   t   c1). For this case, under the space-exchange strategy, the retailers
prot should be one of 11, 
2
1, 
4
1, and 
6
1. It is easy to nd that 
1
1, 
2
1, and 
4
1 are all
greater than 1. But, 
6
1 may or may not be greater than 

1.
3. If S1 < B1 and c1 + 2tS1=B1  u1, then retailer 1s prot with no space exchange
1 = B1(u1 c1)2=(4t). This is the same as that when S1  B1 and c1 +t < u1  c1 +2t.
4. If S1 < B1 and c1 + 2tS1=B1  u1, then 1 = (u1   tS1=B1   c1)  S1, which is smaller
than or equal to B1  (u1   c1)2=(4t) because we can easily show that, for this case, 1
arrives to its maximum value B1  (u1   c1)2=(4t) when c1 + 2tS1=B1 = u1. Therefore,
we can nd that 61 may or may not be greater than 

1 and 
i
1 (i = 1; : : : ; 5; 7; : : : ; 8) is
greater than 1.
The analysis for retailer 2 is similar to the above. This corollary is thus proved.
Appendix E A Further Discussion on the Result in Propo-
sition 3
We learn from Proposition 3 that each retailers total shelf space should be su¢ ciently large
in order to assure that two retailers are willing to implement the space-exchange strategy in
the non-cooperative game. One may note that two retailers with small shelf space could be
also likely to consider the space-exchange strategy. For example, suppose that both retailers 1
and 2 have very small shelf space; e.g., retailer i (i = 1; 2) can stock only two units of product
i in his store before the space exchange, i.e., Si = 2, for i = 1; 2. When two retailer do not
exchange shelf space, retailer i would set his price such that the two consumers who are the
closest to the retailer along the Hotelling line would nd it worthwhile to buy product i. If two
retailers exchange shelf space, then they may raise their prices without losing any consumers,
and their prots could thus be higher than those in the no space exchangecase, because of
the following reason: When retailer i allocates a unit of shelf space in his own store to retailer
j (j = 1; 2, j 6= i), the retailers host shelf space can be used to serve only the customer who
is the closed to retailer is store. That is, Sii = Sij = 1. Hence, in retailer is own store, the
retailer does not need to consider the second closest customer, and can increase his price to
a value such that only the closest customer is willing to buy. Meanwhile, retailer i obtains a
unit of guest shelf space from retailer j, and uses it to serve the product i customer who is the
closest to retailer js store, setting his retail price as in his own store. As a result of exchanging
shelf space with retailer j, retailer is prices (in both stores) are higher than his price before the
space exchange, and the retailer can still serve two customers, as in the no space exchange
case.
The above discussion may deliver a result di¤erent from that in Proposition 3. In fact, such a
di¤erence appears mainly because Proposition 3 holds when two retailers make their decisions
in the non-cooperative game whereas the above discussion is based on the assumption that
two retailers jointly make their decisions in the cooperative setting. We re-consider the above
example where each retailers shelf space can be used to serve only two customers. When retailer
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j allocates a unit of shelf space to retailer i, retailer is best response in the non-cooperative
setting is not to also allocate a unit of shelf space to retailer j but to keep all of his shelf space
Si, because, as discussed in Section 4.1, retailer is prot is increasing in the space Si when
Si is so small that retailer i cannot serve a half of Bi consumers [i.e., Si  Bi(ui   ci)=(2t)].
Hence, two retailersspace allocation decisions (Sii = Sjj = 1, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j) cannot
be obtained in equilibrium. That is, two retailersdecisions in Nash equilibrium may not be
the Pareto optimal. Such a result can be actually regarded as Prisoners Dilemma,which is
indicated as in Table 6 where we note that there is a unique Nash equilibrium (S11; S22) = (2; 2)
because 1(2; 1) > 1(1; 1) > 1(2; 0) > 1(1; 0) and 2(1; 2) > 2(1; 1) > 2(0; 2) > 2(0; 1).
For more information regarding Prisoners Dilemma, see, e.g., Stra¢ n [13, Ch. 12].
Retailer 1
Allocate Do Not Allocate
Retailer 2 Allocate
(1(1; 1); 2(1; 1))
[(S11; S22) = (1; 1)]
(1(2; 1); 2(0; 1))
[(S11; S22) = (2; 1)]
Do Not Allocate
(1(1; 0); 2(1; 2))
[(S11; S22) = (1; 2)]
(1(2; 0); 2(0; 2))
[(S11; S22) = (2; 2)]
Table 6: The Prisoners dilemmain the space-exchange game. Retailer i (i = 1; 2)s decision
Allocatemeans that the retailer decides to allocate a unit of his shelf space to retailer j
(j = 1; 2, j 6= i), and Retailer is decision Do Not Allocatemeans that the retailer does
not allocate any space to retailer j but keeps all of his space Si. In addition, i(Sii; Sji) and
j(Sij; Sjj) denote retailers is and js prots when the retailersspace decisions are Sii and
Sjj, respectively. Note that 1(2; 1) > 1(1; 1) > 1(2; 0) > 1(1; 0) and 2(1; 2) > 2(1; 1) >
2(0; 2) > 2(0; 1).
Moreover, if a retailers store is very small, then two retailers may be willing to open new
stores instead of exchange shelf space (if their costs of opening and sta¢ ng new stores are not
large). For a specic discussion on the impact of xed costs, see Section 5.2. Our result in
Proposition 3 is also in gear with the practice that the retailers exchanging shelf space include,
e.g., Waitrose, Boots, Tim Hortons, and Cold Stone Creamery.
Appendix F Nash Equilibrium when ui > c1 + t (i = 1; 2)
For our game analysis for the case that ui > ci + t (i = 1; 2) in Section 4.2, we provide thirteen
possible Nash equilibria in Table 7.
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Scenario Conditions Nash Equilibrium
(a) S1  B1
2
+
B2
2
, S2  B1
2
+
B2
2
SN11 =
B1
2
; SN22 =
B2
2
(b)
B1 +B2   S2  S1  B1
2
+
B2
2
,
S2  B1
2
+
B2
2
; or
B1
2
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)]  S1  B1
2
+
B2
2
,
S2  B1
2
+
B2(u2   c2)
2t
SN11 =
B1
2
,
SN22 = B1 +B2   S1
(c)
B1(u1   c1)
2t
  B2(u2   c2)
2t
+B2  S1  B1 +B2   S2,
S2  B1
2
+
B2
2
SN11 =
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 = B2 +
B1(u1   c1)
2t
  S1
(d)
S1 = B1 +B2   S2,
S2  B1
2
+
B2
2
B1
2
 SN11  min

B1(u1   c1)
2t
; S1  B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)]] ,
SN22 = B2   S1 + SN11
(e)
S1 < B1 +B2   S2,
S2  B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)] + B2(u2   c2)
2t
SN11 = B1 +
B2(u2   c2)
2t
  S2,
SN22 =
B2(u2   c2)
2t
(f)
S1 < B1 +B2   S2,
S2  B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)] + B2(u2   c2)
2t
SN11 =
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 =
B2(u2   c2)
2t
(g) S1  B1
2
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)], S2  B1
2
+
B2(u2   c2)
2t
SN11 =
B1
2
, SN22 =
B2(u2   c2)
2t
(h)
S1  B1 +B2   S2,
B2
2
+B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]  S2  B1
2
+
B2
2
SN11 = B1 +B2   S2,
SN22 =
B2
2
(i)
S1  B2
2
+
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
S2  B2
2
+B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]
SN11 =
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 =
B2
2
(j)
B1(u1   c1)
2t
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)]  S1  B2
2
+
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
S2 < B1 +B2   S1
SN11 =
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 =
B2
2
+
B1(u1   c1)
2t
  S1
(k)
B1(u1   c1)
2t
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)]  S1  B2
2
+
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
S2 = B1 +B2   S1
S1   B2
2
 SN11  B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 = B2   S1 + SN11
(l)
S1  B1(u1   c1)
2t
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)],
S2  max

B2(u2   c2)
2t
+B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]; B1  B2 + S1
 SN11 = B2(u2   c2)2t + B12   S2,
SN22 =
B2(u2   c2)
2t
(m)
S1  B1(u1   c1)
2t
+B2[1  (u2   c2)=(2t)],
S2  B2(u2   c2)
2t
+B1[1  (u1   c1)=(2t)]
SN11 =
B1(u1   c1)
2t
,
SN22 =
B2(u2   c2)
2t
Table 7: Nash equilibria for 13 scenarios when u1 > c1 + t and u2 > c2 + t.
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